the trial''. 12 Based on these submissions and prior pronouncements by the different chambers, the said decision was intended ''to provide the parties and participants with general guidelines on all matters related to the participation of victims throughout the proceedings''. 13 Nonetheless, many questions concerning victim participation remain controversial and are still pending: one of the three judges dissented 14 and both parties 15 filed an application for leave to appeal, which was finally granted by Trial Chamber I. 16 Undefined legal terms need to be clarified, such as ''personal interests'', ''presentation of views and concerns'' and ''appropriate'' stages of the proceedings, as do the requirements for such presentations, the content of the participation right and issues of standard of proof. The issue of victim participation at the investigation stage and its implications for the balance of interests, as well as the general problems linked to prejudice and inconsistency with the rights of the accused and with principles of fair trial, still have to be resolved. Furthermore, practical issues such as identification of the applicants, the legal representation of victims, collective participation of large victim groups and the form and modalities of presentations need to be assessed. Since leave to appeal has been granted, some of those issues will be settled by the Appeals Chamber. 17 
Various participation regimes
The structure of the Statute and Rules, mainly outlined in Rule 92(1), suggests that the drafters created various victim participation schemes. At least two are easy to identify: the submission of ''representations'' and ''observations'', and participation stricto sensu.
18
The first participation scheme, specifically provided for in Articles 15(3) (authorization of investigations initiated by the Prosecutor ex proprio motu) and 19(3) of the Statute (challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case), takes effect at an early and crucial stage, when the initiation or continuation of the proceedings is at stake. In Article 15 of the Statute, victim participation appears as the logical consequence of the Prosecutor's proprio motu investigation, for which victims constitute an important source of information. 19 With regard to Article 19(3) of the Statute, observations submitted by victims are essential to assess challenges to jurisdiction or admissibility by states or by the defendant, as they provide for a more objective point of view that is linked neither to political nor to individual interests, since it is not directly linked to the reparation regime. No formal application procedure seems to be necessary for these forms of participation, which consist of ''submitting observations'' and ''making representations''. 20 Nevertheless, the question remains as to how the victims will be chosen, how their credibility is assessed and how the information obtained is used and corroborated.
The more complex, second participation scheme, under Article 68(3) of the Statute and Rules 89 et seq., entails an application procedure pursuant to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Rules of the Court 21 and provides for broader participation.
Finally, a specific victim participation scheme has been established with regard to the reparation procedure in Article 75 of the Statute. The inclusion of a possibility of obtaining reparation for victims, similar to ''adhesive procedures'' The application procedure will not be discussed in this article. Rule 89 of the RPE describes the application procedure by written application to the Registrar, who then provides a copy of the application to the prosecution and the defence. They are then entitled to reply within a time limit set by the chamber in charge. The chamber can either accept the application and specify the appropriate proceedings and manner of participation, or reject the application if it considers that the person is not a victim or that the criteria set forth in Article 68(3) of the Statute are not fulfilled in any other form. If an application has been rejected, there is no remedy against the decision, but he or she can file a new application later in the proceedings.
known in civil law systems, 22 is considered as revolutionary in international criminal law. 23 Although integrated in the course of the regular procedure, it forms a kind of extra ''civil action'' procedure that is reflected in the separate procedural regime.
24
Victims of a situation and victims of a case A controversy between the Pre-Trial Chambers and the Prosecutor developed around the question of whether victims should be allowed to participate as early as the investigation stage of a situation -as reflected in the position of Pre-Trial Chamber I in its 17 January 2006 decision (and subsequent rulings), or only at a later stage of the proceedings -as maintained by the Prosecutor. 25 The differentiation between ''situation'' and ''case'' level, although not explicitly mentioned in the ICC's constitutive documents, emanates from the structure of the Statute. 26 Whereas a ''situation'' is broadly defined in terms of temporal and territorial parameters and may include a large number of incidents, supposed perpetrators and thus potential indictments, ''case'' refers to a concrete incident with one or more specific suspects occurring within a situation under investigation, 27 entailing proceedings following the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear.
28
The Pre-Trial Chamber maintained that victim participation at the situation level was not excluded and would ''not per se jeopardise the appearance of integrity and objectivity of the investigation, nor is it inherently inconsistent with basic considerations of efficiency and security''. 29 The Prosecutor on the other hand insisted that the elements defining a victim pursuant to Rule 85 must be read together with Article 68(3) of the Statute in order to qualify a person as victim. He claimed that permitting general victim participation at the situation level had no basis in the Statute. 30 To support this argument, the Prosecutor pursued a two-step test, starting with the general victim qualification of Rule 85, followed by an assessment of whether the personal interests of the victim were directly affected by the proceedings in which he or she wished to participate.
31 Such personal interests must be judicially recognizable 32 and directly related to a specific matter within the proceedings.
33
The 17 January 2006 decision does raise a number of questions and problems. First, early victim participation at the investigation stage might adversely affect the rights of the suspect/accused, the impartiality and independence of the investigation and, most importantly, the expeditiousness of the proceedings as a whole.
34 Second, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not precisely define the procedural rights provided to victims at such an early stage of the proceedings. Further, early involvement of victims under the Article 68 regime is most probably not even in the victims' interest. It is submitted that the separate form of victim involvement in the early stage of the proceedings, 35 potential advantages, such as the counterbalancing of too broad prosecutorial discretion and enhancing the fairness of the investigation, 38 can become effective at all outside the Pre-Trial Chamber scrutiny provided for in Articles 15 and 53 of the Statute. On the contrary, as the Prosecutor contended correctly, premature victim participation entails an unnecessary waste of the Court's resources that could be better used for more meaningful victim participation once proceedings in a case begin. 39 Furthermore, the majority of the so-called ''situation victims'' will most probably not be accepted in a case before the ICC, because the specific incident in which they were victimized is either not investigated at all or will never be the subject of a specific case. Those individuals are then left with unfulfilled hopes and expectations, and might in addition be in serious danger themselves. 40 In addition, the impediment to the objectivity and independence of the investigation 41 and the risk of an imbalance between the interests of the victims and the accused seem important, since prior to the existence of any case no purposeful defence is possible.
The Appeals Chamber 42 unfortunately rejected the Prosecutor's application for extraordinary review of the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision to deny leave to appeal against the 17 January 2006 decision, 43 on the basis of procedural grounds. However, the Appeals Chamber will now have the possibility of rendering a comprehensive ruling regarding the more recent decision. science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes''.
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To qualify as a victim, the applicant must therefore be a natural or a legal person and prove that he, she or it suffered harm resulting from a crime that falls within the ICC's jurisdiction, and that a causal link between the crime and the harm suffered exists. 53 Since the definition is drafted in a rather open way, further interpretation of its elements appears necessary, 54 although contrary to other elements such as the ''personal interest'' in and ''appropriateness'' of the stage of the proceedings, it may not vary much from one stage to another. 55 
Natural person
So far, the Pre-Trial Chamber decisions do not contain much reflection on the definition of the term ''natural person''. Both the Pre-Trial Chamber and Trial Chamber I focused strongly on the issue of victim identification, so the actual interpretation was basically limited to the rather banal conclusion that ''A natural person is thus any person who is not a legal person''.
56 Some subsequent decisions assessed how the identity of the applicant could best be established. 57 Nevertheless, even with regard to this purely procedural requirement, no general approach was discernible in the various pre-trial findings 58 that tried to unify the varying approaches taken by the Pre-Trial Chambers. 59 It seems that some more theoretical analysis of the notion would do no harm, even if it is by far not the most complex part of the victim definition. Questions related to legal (in)capacity in general, and especially the legal capacity of conducting proceedings in one's own name, 60 are particularly likely to occur in the future and will require more thorough consideration. 61 Furthermore, the issue of representation of minors by their parents or other family members is of a certain importance, especially if the charges contain the war crime of recruiting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen and using them in hostilities, as in the Lubanga case. 62 In addition, a problem may arise regarding victims who are simultaneously perpetrators, as the example of the Lubanga case shows. 63 Child soldiers are typically victims and perpetrators at the same time. resolution from the Appeals Chamber on this issue will materially advance the proceedings, in that certainty will be provided and the important work of the court to identify victims will move forward in a progressive manner'' (ibid., para. 17). 61 None of the decisions mentions this requirement, which also entails a person's capacity to appoint a legal representative or to act as the legal representative for another person. As the notion of ''legal capacity to act'' differs from one legal system to another, it might be necessary to develop an autonomous interpretation for international criminal proceedings. Some of the issues related to questions of representation of minor victims by other victims (e.g. parents, guardians) were discussed by the relevant Pre-Trial Chamber in connection with procedural aspects of the proceedings prior to the substantive assessment of the application. E.g. 17.01.2006 PTC I Decision, above note 10, para. 102: with regard to formal requirements for the applications, such as the kind of forms used, the identity of the applicants, the signatures and the authorization of an NGO to file documents on behalf of the victims. 62 The issue has not been discussed so far, except in the PTC II 10.08.2007 Decision on Victims ' Applications, above note 53, para. 20, where the judge requested the Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) to submit a report indicating from what age the Ugandan legal system allows documents meeting the ICC conditions to be issued to individuals, and to provide information about the existence and obtainability of documents establishing the link between a child and a member of his or her family, such as birth certificates or other types of documents. Another delicate problem to assess is whether applicants sign applications knowingly and willingly, in particular with full knowledge of the consequences of such an application and the potential security risks involved. In order to monitor the kind of circumstances under which such applications are filed and whether the applicants were fully informed, the 
Organizations or institutions as victims
The ICC system does not only allow organizations to represent natural persons; under specific circumstances they can qualify as victims themselves. Organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes fall under Rule 85(b). This controversial broadening of the traditional understanding of ''victim'' is based on the idea that legal entities are often the target of certain war crimes. 65 Delegations opposed to the inclusion of legal persons feared a diversion of the Court's resources, better used for individual victims, and potential misuse of the participation scheme by multinational companies. 66 The compromise as laid down in the provision should, however, exclude such applications. Yet, undefined notions such as ''direct harm'' and ''dedication to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes'' or ''places and objects for humanitarian purposes'' call for interpretation. 67 Hitherto no application by an organization or institution has been filed and thus the Court has not yet addressed any of the above questions. 68 The notion of harm 73 The judges considered that the following incidents were likely to cause harm: abduction and enslavement; carrying heavy loads for some 500 kilometres without eating or drinking; and torture and unlawful detention resulting in physical and mental suffering. 74 The loss of family members after being forced to see them tortured was deemed to cause serious emotional and mental suffering, and the looting and burning of houses and other property was characterized as economic loss. 75 Physical injuries and psychological trauma as a result of exposure to fire and random shooting, severe burns and witnessing events of an exceedingly violent and shocking nature, as well as the enlistment of children, was considered to cause physical and emotional harm. 76 According to Pre-Trial Chamber I, no definitive determination of the harm suffered by the victims could be rendered at this early stage, especially when referring to ''situation victims''. 77 This consideration is relevant with regard to the principle of presumption of innocence, the application of which could be impeded if the determination of harm goes too far.
Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court Acts such as those described above must qualify as crimes falling under the ICC's jurisdiction ratione materiae, loci, personae and temporis. Again, the assessment depends on the stage of the proceedings to which the application for participation refers, although Trial Chamber I opined that ''Rule 85 of the Rules does not have the effect of restricting the participation of victims to the crimes contained in the charges confirmed by Pre-Trial Chamber I, and this restriction is not provided for in the Rome Statute framework''. 78 completely disagree with the assertion of the Majority that the Statute does not limit the Chamber's jurisdiction to the crimes attributed to the accused. In truth, the drafters of the Rome Statute have been careful to address issues of jurisdiction through the guise of the case brought before the Court. Furthermore, it is symptomatic that the Statute restricts the parties' presentation of evidence to that which is relevant to the case before the Chamber'' (footnotes omitted).
also diverges from earlier holdings of the Pre-Trial Chambers. 80 The scope of the referral therefore defines prima facie the situation (e.g. northern Uganda for the Ugandan referral, Darfur for the Security Council referral), although nothing in the Statute hinders the Prosecutor, subject to Pre-Trial Chamber authorization, from expanding the scope of the investigations ex proprio motu, at least in relation to state referrals. 81 The scope of a situation emanating from investigations initiated by the Prosecutor 82 would probably be defined by the Pre-Trial Chamber authorization.
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Therefore applicants who were allegedly victims of crimes committed within such a situation defined ratione temporis 84 and ratione loci 85 and where the alleged acts fell within the Court's jurisdiction ratione materiae 86 would qualify as ''situation victims''. ''Case victims'' have to show that they have suffered harm directly linked to a crime set forth in a warrant of arrest, summons or charges. The Court automatically re-examines whether a person already admitted as a victim of a specific situation still qualifies as a victim of a case. context of a situation or of a case''. 88 It was sufficient to prove that ''the spatial and temporal circumstances surrounding the appearance of the harm and the occurrence of the incident seem to overlap, or at least to be compatible and not clearly inconsistent''. 89 This consideration is probably correct, as any further assessment of the causal link could lead to a violation of the presumption of innocence. 90 Once proceedings in a case are initiated, the causal link to be proved is much narrower and limited to the harm suffered in relation to the specific crimes for which the accused is presumed criminally responsible. 91 Contrary to the opinion of Trial Chamber I, victim applications at a case level should be considered with regard to the crimes charged, and the right of victims to participate is not ''principally dependent on whether their personal interests are affected in accordance with Article 68(3) of the Statute''.
92

Conditions for participation in Article 68(3) of the Statute
Once an applicant has cleared the first hurdle of the victim qualification pursuant to Rule 85 of the Rules, the Court must at the relevant point in the procedure take the second step of assessing whether the three requirements for participation stipulated in Article 68(3) of the Statute exist in relation to the stage of the proceedings in which the applicant wants to participate. The judges must determine whether there is sufficient personal interest for participation, whether such participation is appropriate at the procedural stage in question and whether it would be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. These three requirements obviously change from one stage of the procedure to another and must therefore be re-evaluated by the chamber in charge at the relevant moment. As yet it is not very clear whether such reexamination is automatic, as suggested by Pre-Trial Chamber I for the step from situation to case level, 93 applying for the status of victim in respect of a situation requests to be accorded the status of victim in any case ensuing from the investigation of such a situation, the Chamber automatically takes this second request into account as soon as such a case exists, so that it is unnecessary to file a second application.'' In the DRC situation, PTC I actually reviewed the initial victim application for participation in the investigation of the situation of the first six ''situation victims'' when the first case, that of Thomas Lubanga, came up: 29.06.2006 PTC I Decision, above note 40, para. 6f., where the PTC considered that the applicants had not demonstrated any causal link between the harm they suffered and the crimes contained in the arrest warrant against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.
Appeals Chamber with regard to participation in an interlocutory appeal proceeding.
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The applicant's personal interest in participating at the situation level is considered equivalent to the interest of identifying the potential perpetrators in an investigation as the ''first step towards their indictment'', especially in view of the impact investigations have on future orders for reparations.
95 With regard to the case level, the personal interest of the applicant must relate specifically to the concrete proceedings against a particular person. The decisions rendered so far were not clear about when this criterion was met, apparently suggesting that being affected by a crime was sufficient to establish such a personal interest. 96 The 18 January 2008 decision, however, introduced a new criterion: the critical question was whether the contents of the victim application must either establish that ''there is a real evidential link between the victim and the evidence which the Court will be considering during [the] trial, leading to the conclusion that the victim's personal interests are affected'' or determine whether the victim was ''affected by an issue arising during [the] trial because his or her personal interests are in a real sense engaged by it''. 97 For an interlocutory appeal, the Appeals Chamber held that personal interest in the issues raised on appeal must exist, and that these issues do not belong instead to the role assigned to the Prosecutor. 98 94 In its judgment on Lubanga's appeal against the PTC decision refusing his provisional release, the Appeals Chamber ruled that even those victims who are generally admitted to participate at a specific stage of the proceedings (in casu in the intermediate pre-trial phase between the issuing of a warrant of arrest and the confirmation of charges hearing) must, in order to participate in an interlocutory appeal within this specific procedural phase, first apply for leave to participate in the appeals proceeding in the Appeals Chamber: 13.02. As regards the appropriateness of the participation and its consistency with fair trial standards and the rights of the accused, instead of completely rejecting victim participation the judges tend to rely more on defining certain modalities of participation that allow those interests to be safeguarded, based on the idea that it was more the mode of participation that could be prejudicial than the actual participation as such. 99 For the situation level, the Pre-Trial Chamber considered it sufficient to appoint an ad hoc counsel to defend the interests and rights of a potential future defendant. 100 Furthermore, only public and not confidential documents were accessible to victims. For participation at later stages it was considered as adequate protection of the defendant's rights that he be allowed, in accordance with Rule 91(2) of the Rules, to respond to the victims' views and concerns. Additionally, both in the confirmation of charges hearing 101 and in the interlocutory appeal, 102 the interests of the defendant were taken into account by restricting the modalities of participation.
Victim participation at different stages of the ICC proceedings
Neither the Statute nor the Rules give details about the substance and content of victim participation and their impact on the proceedings. It is, however, quite obvious that, as already discussed above, such participation differs considerably depending on the stage of the proceedings at which it takes place. Flexibility is the main characteristic of the provisions on victim participation. The modalities of participation are fully within the discretion of the chamber in charge and may be adapted by judges to the specific circumstances of the stage of the proceedings.
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They are limited only by the requirement that victim participation must be appropriate and not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair, impartial and expeditious trial. 
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Initiation and triggering stage
Clearly, victims play an important role in the referral or triggering phase prior to the existence of a proper judicial procedure in a situation or a case, and without being formally admitted to participate in proceedings. Referrals by states, for example, must be accompanied by ''supporting documentation as is available to the State'', which will to a large extent rely on information gathered from victims. 105 The same goes for referrals by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 106 and the initiation of investigations by the Prosecutor ex proprio motu. 107 The reality of conflict situations, where civilians are caught between opposing parties, is such that persons giving information to whatever organization obviously put themselves in considerable danger. Gathering information in such situations is an extremely sensitive matter. third party, apart from the prosecution) is in a strong position. 110 Nothing in the Statute or in the Rules indicates that such a possibility exists. It is evident, however, that by providing the Prosecutor with relevant information, victims' organizations and other NGOs will play an important role in ''triggering'' a proprio motu investigation, and that victim participation 111 puts a certain pressure on the Office of the Prosecutor to pursue an investigation or prosecution.
112 If the Prosecutor decides not to proceed, 113 victims can apply for participation in the subsequent proceedings before the Pre-Trial Chamber, contrary to the referring state or the UN Security Council. In the light of this the contention that victims cannot refer matters directly to the Court, although such possibilities do exist in certain national judicial systems, 114 seems less relevant, especially if one takes into consideration the above-mentioned dangers of an instrumentalization of victims and the security risks they might face in conflict situations.
115
Investigation stage
The procedural rights of victims admitted to participate in the investigation phase under Rule 89 has so far not been clearly defined. The Pre-Trial Chamber stressed that participation should not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the defendant and envisaged specific measures, such as appointing an ad hoc counsel to represent a potential future defendant's interests. The Pre-Trial Chamber also held that the victims' right to be heard by the Chamber entails the right to present views and concerns and to file documents pertaining to the ongoing investigation. It places the Court under a positive dual obligation, not only to allow the presentation of victims' views and concerns but also to examine them. 115 The Prosecutor's decision to investigate on his or her own initiative is always subject to Pre-Trial Chamber scrutiny with victim involvement, as described above. Olásolo, above note 26, pp. 66 ff. In order to guarantee that victims can present their view, the Prosecutor must inform victims known to the Office of the Prosecutor or to the Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) prior to seeking authorization from the PTC. (RPE, Rule 50). The rationale of this provision is that victims are close to the situation and therefore best able to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber about the situation presented by the Office of the Prosecutor. Stahn et al., above note 18, p. 226.
Furthermore, victims are generally entitled to participate in public proceedings unless it is otherwise decided by the chamber. 116 Victims are also entitled to request the Pre-Trial Chamber to order specific proceedings and to issue all notifications.
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As already mentioned, Article 19(3) of the Statute provides for another possibility of victim participation in the pre-trial phase, namely in proceedings on challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of a case 118 either by the accused/suspect or by a state with jurisdiction over a case. It is not clear whether the Article 19 provision is also regulated by the general rules on participation. In the Lubanga case, the small group of persons accepted as victims according to Rule 89 of the Rules were invited to submit their views. 119 This suggests that only persons accepted as victims under Rule 89 of the Rules may participate in the proceedings in accordance with Article 19(3) of the Statute.
Confirmation of charges hearing
Article 61 of the Statute provides that the charges brought against a person must be confirmed within a reasonable time after the person's surrender or voluntary appearance before the Court. In order to assess the charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber holds a hearing in the presence of the Prosecutor, the person charged and his or her counsel. It confirms the charges if it considers that ''there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged''. 120 Although the right of victims to participate in the confirmation hearing is not evident at first sight when reading Article 61 of the Statute, they do seem to have an interest in participation, inter alia to influence the final formulation of the charges or even to request measures regarding forfeiture. 121 Four victims 116 Whereas in confidential proceedings no victim participation is possible unless the Chamber decides otherwise. 17.01.2006 PTC I Decision, above note 10, paras. 71 ff. 117 Rule 92(5).These are: notification of proceedings before the Court, including the date of hearings and any postponement thereof, and the date of delivery of the decision; victims are also entitled to be ''informed about requests, submissions, motions and other documents relating to such specific proceedings, where they are held in public or where persons having the status of victims are authorised to participate''. 17.01.2006 PTC I Decision, above note 10, para. 76. 118 Article 17 of the Statute regulates whether a case is admissible or not, which is mainly a question of complementarity, an issue that is not the subject of this study. In brief, a case is not admissible if it is being investigated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over it, unless that state is unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution. participated through their legal representatives in the confirmation of charges hearing in the Lubanga case. 122 Their participation was limited to an opening and a closing statement, both containing only legal observations, as their request for anonymity did not allow any personal statements, and the presentation of facts other than those put forward by the Prosecutor would have resulted in anonymous accusations. 123 Yet if the purpose of victim participation is to give victims a voice and the possibility of telling their story, purely legal presentations do not fulfil that purpose. The hope is that views of a more personal nature might subsequently be presented. 124 In addition, the prosecution and the defence were ordered to draw up a list of the public documents included in their evidence and provide that list to the victims' legal representatives. Those representatives themselves were not allowed to present evidence or to question witnesses. 125 
Trial stage
Unlike the participation discussed in the previous sections, the participation in further procedural stages seems to be regulated solely by the regime of Article 68(3) of the Statute and Rule 93 of the Rules, independently of the stage of the proceedings. 126 It would go beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the right to notification and legal representation of victims, 127 although these are essential for victim participation. In the Lubanga case the representatives of the four victims who had participated in the confirmation of charges hearing were allowed to present their views in written 128 and oral 129 form with regard to all the procedural and substantive issues that arose prior to the actual trial procedure. 130 In the 18 January 2008 decision, Trial Chamber I specified further where and how victims may participate in a trial. It held, for instance, that victims ''may be permitted to tender and examine evidence if in the view of the Chamber it will assist it in the determination of the truth, and if in this sense the Court has ''requested'' the evidence''. They are allowed to put appropriate questions whenever the evidence under consideration engages their personal interests. 131 The participating victims had access to the public redacted version of the prosecution's ''summary of presentation of evidence'' and the public evidence listed in the prosecution's annexes thereto. 132 On the other hand, inspection pursuant to Rules 77 and 78 relates only to the prosecution and the defence. 133 Further, victims may, upon request, be permitted to participate in closed and ex parte hearings, depending on the circumstances and the facts of the particular application and subject to consultation with the parties. 134 
Victim representation
An important procedural difference exists between victims who are legally represented and those who are not. Rule 91 makes it clear that only victims assisted by legal representatives enjoy the specific ''enhanced'' procedural rights which go beyond the right to participate in hearings. According to Pre-Trial Chamber I it could even entail questioning of witnesses, experts or the accused, whereby such procedural actions would be strictly reserved to the legal representative of victims in order to protect the rights of the accused. 135 The Court seems to go beyond the modalities stipulated in Rules 89 or 144.
As to the issue of common legal representation, 136 Trial Chamber I held in the 18 January 2008 decision that ''the personal appearance of a large number of victims could affect the expeditiousness and fairness of the proceedings'' and that ''victims' common views and concerns may sometimes be better presented by a common legal representative''. The decision whether or not there should be joint representation would be decided at any particular stage in the proceedings proprio motu or upon request of a party or participant .137 It is indeed necessary ''to apply a flexible approach to the question of the appropriateness of common legal representation, and the appointment of any particular common legal representative'', and ''detailed criteria cannot be laid down in advance''. [123] [124] [125] . In order to protect the individual victim interests the chamber would apply a flexible approach, taking into consideration criteria such as the language spoken by the victims, ''links between them provided by time, place and circumstance and the specific crimes of which they are alleged to be victims will all be potentially of relevance''. An application of the victims' representatives to participate in the appeals procedure initiated by the defence against the confirmation of charges was rejected, due to lack of personal interest. 13.02.2007 Appeals Chamber Judgement, above note 94, para. 55.
Appeal and review proceedings
Whereas the right to appeal against acquittal or conviction or against a sentence pursuant to Article 81 of the Statute is clearly limited to the Prosecutor and to the convicted person, Article 82(4) of the Statute explicitly mentions the right of victim representatives to appeal against an order for reparations. With regard to other appeals, the general participation rules mentioned above seem to apply and the key question here is again whether the ''personal interests of the victims are affected'' by the matter under appeal. This could conceivably be so if the victims' security would be affected. In the Lubanga case the Appeals Chamber accepted victim participation in the defendant's appeal against the Pre-Trial Chamber decision to refuse provisional release; observations were, however, ''limited and had to be specifically relevant to the issues arising in the appeal rather than more generally''.
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The same probably goes for participation in the revision procedure, 140 especially because in a revision a new trial is opened and victims' personal interests might again be affected.
141
Reparation procedures
As mentioned above, special procedural rules are laid down for the reparation proceedings, which are also open to persons who did not previously participate as victims in the ICC proceedings. 142 A decision on reparation must be requested by the victims in writing, in quite a comprehensive and detailed application that differs from other participation applications, 143 as the Court would only in exceptional circumstances act on its own motion. While the Statute and Rules seem to foresee that the reparation decision would normally be taken within the regular trial proceedings, Article 76(3) of the Statute suggests that if a separate sentencing hearing 144 had been requested, reparations would be dealt with in a distinct sentencing proceeding of that nature or even, where necessary, in another additional reparation hearing. In any form of reparation procedure, the Court considers representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims, other interested persons or interested states, 145 and then makes an order directly against ff., 1570f. 142 There seems to be a specific interest of the Court to make reparation procedures widely public. See e.g. RPE, Rule 96. 143 Rule 95 ff. of the RPE lay down a quite detailed set of norms spelling out the application procedure. 144 Article 76(2) of the Statute. 145 State co-operation is an important condition for the functioning of the reparation regime, thus Articles 75(4) and (5) of the Statute refer to Articles 93(1) and 101 thereof, which both contain provisions a convicted person, specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, such as restitution, compensation or rehabilitation. 146 Unlike victims' representations in other proceedings, the questioning in a reparation hearing is more comprehensive, and cannot be limited to written observations or submissions pursuant to Rule 91(4). On the contrary, the victim representative can, subject to leave by the Chamber concerned, even question witnesses, experts and the person concerned. Reparation hearings aim at establishing injury, harm or loss resulting from a crime committed by the convicted person. Pre-Trial Chamber II has already indicated that the standard of proof with regard to the nexus element of the victim definition is much higher for reparation purposes than for other stages of the proceedings. 147 Awarding reparations on a collective basis is explicitly provided for in Rule 97(1), which also stipulates that such awards may be handled by the Trust Fund ''where the number of the victims and the scope, forms and modalities of reparations make a collective award more appropriate''. 148 
Specific problems in relation to victim participation
One of the most evident problems arising from the participation regime of the ICC is that of striking a balance between victim interests and other interests in criminal procedures. 149 It has often been argued that such participation impedes the equilibrium between prosecution and defence, and that it interferes with the suspected or accused person's right to a fair 150 and expeditious trial 151 and the interest of the Prosecutor in preserving evidence and bringing victims into play as witnesses. Also victim participation, especially if granted with the proviso of protection measures, might obstruct the public's interest in a public hearing which offers full scrutiny of the administration of justice. 152 There is an additional concern specific to the ICC as a treaty-based institution, namely the interests of the member states in expeditious trials and the limitation of costs and expenses. As shown above, early victim participation at the investigation phase might interfere with the Prosecutor's interests in an objective, impartial and confidential investigation. 153 The balancing of these conflicting interests must be taken into account by the judges when granting access to victims, especially when defining the scope and modalities of participation. The issue of the balancing of interests may also be seen in a broader context when discussing general aspects of the purposes of punishing and sentencing in international criminal law.
Another important issue to consider in relation to victim participation is the ambiguity of how to deal with victims who are of interest as witnesses; this issue is especially pertinent in international criminal law processes, which largely rely on victim testimonies. 154 Whereas the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) had to deal with the problem of excessive instrumentalization of victims by the parties, the ICC will face the far more complex dilemma of admitting persons to participate as victims in the proceedings who are at the same time of potential interest as witnesses. Neither the Statute nor the Rules excludes victims from participating in the proceedings to testify as witnesses. However, a person who participates as a victim in the ICC proceedings could be lost as witness, mainly because of that person's quasi-party position akin to that of a partie civile in civil law systems and its impact on fair trial guarantees. 155 In view of the above-mentioned limitation of the ''enhanced'' participation rights to the victims' representatives, it could be assumed that the personal involvement of a victim does not reach such a level that his or her participation would be incompatible with the role of a witness. 156 However, even if victims can be heard as witnesses, their testimony could be somewhat flawed because of a certain appearance of partiality and the clear interests they have in the outcome of the procedure, that is, with regard to reparations. The Prosecutor's strong opposition to early and extensive victim Change of paradigm in punishing international crimes
Victims' interests in sentencing
When discussing the influence of victim participation on sentencing in international criminal trials, consideration of some general issues of sentencing in international criminal law cannot be avoided. Penal lawyers and criminologists have discussed them extensively. 158 The focus here therefore centres on the specific role victims play in international sentencing practice mainly in the context of the ICC, which, unlike the statutory provisions of the ad hoc tribunals, 159 provides some guidelines for the determination of sentences. As none of the cases before the ICC has yet reached the sentencing stage, this issue is analysed in the light of general considerations with regard to sanctions and their purposes.
One would expect that the scale of the atrocities and the immensity of international crimes would be reflected in the sentences rendered, or at least that justifications for punishment in international criminal law would take into account the magnitude and abhorrence of the acts. 160 This raises the question of whether sanctions and their justifications can and should, in one way or another, reflect victims' interests. ''Classic'' theories of justifications of punishment -such as deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation -usually do not. However, in specific purposes of punishment that are inherent in international criminal law, victims play a more important role than is usually the case in domestic legal contexts. 161 Such particular ''international'' sentencing purposes, tailored for crimes committed in the context of collective and/or state violence, could, for instance, be an expression of international solidarity with the victims and a documentation of the facts that goes beyond state propaganda. 162 Seen from a human rights perspective, the obligation of states to prosecute perpetrators of gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law is generally acknowledged for acts constituting crimes under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 163 Although this obligation is not explicitly spelt out in international human rights instruments, it is nevertheless deemed by international 164 and regional 165 human rights supervisory bodies to be part of the right to remedy and of the states' obligation to ensure respect for human rights.
The judges of the ad hoc tribunals, although given considerable scope with regard to sentencing, 166 nevertheless dealt with the question of the purpose of penalties. Yet victim-related issues played a rather insignificant role in the judges' considerations, 167 although they indicated that sanctions in international criminal law do have certain objectives that differ from those typically found in national legal contexts. 168 The purposes of penalties considered by the ad hoc tribunals were mainly retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, the protection of society, justice, ending impunity, promoting reconciliation and restoring peace. 169 Only one sentencing judgment specifically mentions victims' interests 170 as a particular purpose of punishment.
The constitutive documents of the ICC do not specifically refer to the purposes of punishment, although they are implied in some way in the Preamble to the Statute, 171 thus leaving the ICC judges with broad discretion. Some victimoriented sentencing principles might, however, be drawn from the abovementioned case law. Retribution, often referred to as the main objective of punishment, 172 could to some extent accommodate victims' interests as long as it is not understood as revenge. In view of the specific circumstances of massive and collective violence, retributive sentiments of victims and their relatives cannot be completely disregarded. Such considerations are, however, a balancing act, as they may hamper reconciliation 173 and impede efforts to respect the right of the accused or convicted person to individualized, fair and proportional punishment. Reconciliation and reconstruction efforts are seen as an important aim of international justice, and punishing those most responsible for gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law can in many respects add to such efforts, 174 although the inherent risk exists that it may be misunderstood by the public and potentially lead to adverse effects, such as the self-victimization of the perpetrators or perception of that punishment as ineffective 175 victors' justice. 176 Therefore aspects of restorative justice should also be taken into consideration, as reflected for example in the Statute's Article 75 on reparations and Article 79 on the Trust Fund. 177 Moreover, the declaratory value of criminal law 178 can have a healing impact on victims at both a collective 179 and an individual level. 180 The public perception that justice is done is one way to break the vicious circle of hatred and violence. 181 Even classic purposes such as deterrence and incapacitation could accommodate the interests of victims by giving them a general, collective feeling of security in knowing that the former regime will not return, and a personal awareness that the perpetrator is not at liberty and able to repeat what he or she did to them. 182 A more systematic and coherent approach to sentencing, which would enhance the foreseeability of the sanction and thus better respect the principle of legality, would also help victims to cope with the difficult psychological process of following a criminal proceeding. 183 
Selectivity
One factor to be taken into account in international criminal procedure is the high level of selectivity due to the very aim of international criminal prosecutions, namely to focus on the most heinous crimes and on the perpetrators who bear the greatest responsibility. 184 This extreme selectivity is expressed in the very object and purpose of the ICC as set out in the Preamble to the Statute, and is inherent in the structure of ICC procedure as a whole. 185 With regard to victim interests to be reflected in that procedure the selectivity is even greater, as shown by the practical and individual impediments facing victims wishing to approach the Court and the high procedural thresholds explained above. This high degree of selectivity results in a somewhat prejudiced conception of the events in question; the resulting sanction thus cannot make up for the atrocities committed and the suffering caused, as it might be able to do in a national system of penal sanctions. However, as pointed out by several authors, it is ultimately impossible to determine empirically whether international punishment really contributes to peace and reconciliation and is thus justifiable from this perspective. 186 Sentencing therefore takes on a more symbolic dimension, which might serve not only the victims able to put forward their views directly, but ultimately the victimized group as a whole. The trials of the few selected perpetrators, representing only a very small proportion of all that has occurred, acquire a kind of pars pro toto character; 187 they are a symbolic act, which is of course of limited effect for the society concerned or the international community as a whole if the main perpetrators cannot be brought to justice. The sanction becomes exemplary, and the demand for one-to-one compensation for the injustice suffered thus becomes less relevant.
The necessity of reparation
However, to leave the rather theoretical and philosophical discussion on purposes of sanctions and return to the harsh reality of the problems facing victims in their everyday lives, it must be stressed that there are often many material needs that are more important for their survival. 188 The aspect of material reparation, going beyond the immaterial satisfaction of judgment and sentence, should consequently not be neglected. Yet the threshold for victims to be compensated under Article 75 of the Statute is even higher than for their participation in proceedings under Article 68(3) thereof. In situations with typically large numbers of victims, only a very small number of them would finally receive reparation. The ICC will probably therefore have to envisage collective reparations rather than individual ones. Otherwise, a large and costly mass claims administration would need be set up 189 similar, for example, to the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC) for Bosnia and Herzegovina 190 or the UN Compensation Commission (UNCC). 191 The ICC Trust Fund seems to focus more on reparation based on community projects benefiting the victimized community as a whole, rather than only individual victims. 192 A discrepancy between victims who participate in ICC proceedings and those who do not will nonetheless still remain. Another factor to be considered with regard to selectivity is that of victim protection. Since the situation in regions where ICC investigations take place can continue to be extremely volatile and insecure even during those investigations, the singling out of certain victims or witnesses might create problems not only for them but also for others who, unlike them, remain unprotected. One solution proposed to counterbalance the high level of selectivity inherent in international criminal jurisdiction is to combine it with other transitional justice mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation commissions, as for instance in Sierra Leone. 193 
Concluding remarks
If the ICC wants to keep its promise of serious consideration for victims' interests, it urgently needs to define a more comprehensive, concerted and defined approach towards victim participation. Without this, the laudable project of giving victims a voice in criminal proceedings on the most serious crimes of concern to the international community risks ending as a farce. Today it is already clear that the Court's capacity to handle huge numbers of victim applications is limited. Solutions must therefore be found to allow the ICC to discharge its primary mandate, namely to ''put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes'' and thus to contribute to their prevention, while at the same time according due respect to the opposing interests of the accused, the prosecution, the public and the victims and complying with general standards of a fair, impartial and expeditious trial. If this delicate balance is not attained throughout the whole trial, in such a way that the Court remains just and credible to all participants and to the society affected by the crimes, even sentencing will become insignificant and fail to meet the purposes of punishment in international criminal law.
The attempt of Trial Chamber I to develop a more consistent approach to victim issues is indispensable. The organs of the ICC must promptly devise and establish a common strategy to bring about a meaningful victim participation that respects to the fullest extent possible the rights, needs and interests of all participants. Serious consideration of victims' interests also implies an obligation not to create erroneous hopes and expectations that cannot be fulfilled, will leave victims frustrated and may place them in an even more difficult situation than they would have been without participating in ICC proceedings. Overenthusiastically allowing victims to take part in investigations at situation level, for instance, gave rise to such hopes. In addition, a more transparent, precise and above all cohesive and consistent jurisprudence would enhance the credibility and predictability of the Court's case law, enabling victims and their representatives to estimate better whether their application has a chance at all. Otherwise, the Court is in danger of becoming paralysed by processing applications and handling purely procedural submissions without substantially advancing cases. Finally, sentencing practice needs to compensate in some way for the extremely selective character of international criminal trials, taking into consideration the effects of punishment on victims and the societies affected by the massive crimes under review, although without impeding the rights of the accused.
